



Exclusionary Advertising?  
The Case for Cautious Enforcement of  
42 USC § 3604(c) Against Minority-Language 
Housing Advertisements 
Emily A. Vernon† 
Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), codified at 42 USC § 3604(c), 
prohibits advertisements that “indicate[ ] any preference” on the basis of race,  
national origin, and other protected categories. The text of the FHA, however, is  
ambiguous regarding its applicability to the language in which housing advertise-
ments appear, raising the specter of potential liability in communities where resi-
dents speak and write in multiple languages. Using Chicago’s Chinatown as a case 
study, this Comment examines whether the exclusive use of Chinese-language ad-
vertisements for housing in Chinatown violates § 3604(c). I begin by enumerating a 
series of factors that courts should consider: (1) the demographics of the relevant 
community, (2) the identities and language capabilities of the parties, (3) how an 
“ordinary reader” in the relevant community would perceive the advertisement, and 
(4) translation costs. The goal of this approach is to strike a workable balance be-
tween minority-language advertisements’ inclusive effect with respect to immigrant 
landlords and prospective residents, while acknowledging Congress’s intent to com-
bat exclusionary housing messages. 
Furthermore, I argue that even if such advertisements technically run afoul of 
§ 3604(c), courts should interpret the FHA as a legislative scheme that protects mi-
nority communities’ housing rights, rather than uncritically mandating integration 
and assimilation. Minority-language communities generate network effects by bring-
ing together speakers and readers of a common language. To avoid unnecessarily 
jettisoning these benefits, courts should construe § 3604(c) to permit advertisements 
that convey the existence of a language community. Such advertisements signal that 
individuals who may be unwelcome elsewhere are welcomed in the community, but 
they do not necessarily “indicate” that nonspeakers and nonreaders are unwelcome. 
Thus, courts should hesitate before enforcing § 3604(c) against Chinese landlords 
and newspapers absent extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent. 
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JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to my fellow 
Law Review editors for sharpening my thinking throughout the writing process. Any 
lingering errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Apartment listings in Chicago’s Chinatown neighborhood are 
notoriously difficult to find.1 Geographic searches on apartment 
rental websites yield a curious absence of hits where the neigh-
borhood, concentrated at the intersection of Cermak Road and 
Wentworth Avenue on the city’s near southwest side, should be. 
A recent local news investigation revealed that “most Chinatown 
apartments are rented to Chinese tenants through exclusively 
Chinese networks.”2 As a result, prospective tenants must find 
apartments via Chinese-language newspapers, Chinese-language 
 
 1 Monica Eng, Why Chicago’s Chinatown Is Practically Invisible on Apartment 
Rental Sites (WBEZ, Oct 29, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/DMD2-7VNV. 
 2 Id. 
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signs around the neighborhood, Chinese social media websites, or 
word of mouth. Off the record, some Chinese landlords have ad-
mitted that they prefer to rent to Chinese tenants, citing cultural 
familiarity and a shared understanding that tenants are respon-
sible for their own maintenance needs.3 
This departure from typical advertising practices raises the 
question: Does the exclusive use of Chinese-language advertise-
ments for housing in Chinatown violate the Fair Housing  
Act4 (FHA)? Professor Allison Bethel says the practice might not 
violate the letter of the law, “[b]ut it definitely violates the spirit 
of the law, which, after all, is to foster more open communities.”5 
On the one hand, such advertisements may send an implicit mes-
sage of exclusion, suggesting that non-Chinese residents are not 
welcome.6 On the other hand, Chinese-language advertisements 
also send a message of inclusion to recent immigrants and  
Chinese Americans who communicate primarily or exclusively in 
Chinese.7 
Pondering the legality of minority-language housing adver-
tisements is not merely an academic exercise. As the United 
States transitions from a majority-white nation to a majority- 
minority nation,8 judges will undoubtedly confront difficult ques-
tions arising from the interaction of diverse populations.9 The 
United States looks (and sounds) very different than it did several 
 
 3 Id. 
 4 Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq. 
 5 Eng, Why Chicago’s Chinatown Is Practically Invisible (cited in note 1). 
 6 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 
104 Mich L Rev 1835, 1854–55 (2006) (discussing the ways in which residential advertis-
ing can communicate “exclusionary vibes”). 
 7 Some real estate developers explicitly cater to residents who want to live in a com-
munity centered around a common heritage. See, for example, Dennis Rodkin, Retirement 
Community Focuses on Indian-Americans (Crain’s Chicago Business, Oct 18, 2018), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/72XG-Y8GA. 
 8 See Older People Projected to Outnumber Children for First Time in U.S. History 
(US Census Bureau, Mar 13, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8F66-SSW6 (“By 2020, 
less than half of children in the United States are projected to be non-Hispanic white 
alone.”); William H. Frey, The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects 
(Brookings, Mar 14, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/898A-JJMD. 
 9 For an example in the employment discrimination context, see generally EEOC v 
Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d 233 (7th Cir 1993) (addressing whether a small busi-
ness’s use of word-of-mouth hiring, which resulted in an overwhelmingly Korean workforce, 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). For an example in the housing discrimination con-
text, see Reyes v Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd Partnership, 903 F3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir 
2018) (concluding that Latino residents of a mobile home park stated a prima facie case of 
national origin discrimination because the landlord’s policy requiring proof of documentation 
had a disparate impact on Latinos), cert denied, 139 S Ct 2026 (2019). 
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decades ago.10 To take one example, between 2000 and 2010, the 
Asian population in the United States grew four times faster than 
the total US population—outpacing any other racial group.11  
Accordingly, Chicago’s Chinatown provides a practical case study 
for examining how the FHA should apply in minority-language 
communities. 
Passed in 1968, the FHA prohibits discrimination on the ba-
sis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” 
in the sale or rental of a dwelling.12 Section 3604(c) also makes it 
illegal to 
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or pub-
lished any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to 
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to 
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.13 
Subsequent court decisions have clarified that the FHA imposes 
liability not only on landlords, but also on newspapers and other 
media that publish discriminatory housing advertisements.14 
As of this writing, I am unaware of any cases in which pro-
spective tenants or homeowners have sought to impose liability 
on Chinese landlords or publishers under § 3604(c). In fact, there 
is scant case law addressing the broader issue of whether and 
 
 10 See, for example, Camille Ryan, Language Use in the United States: 2011 *7 (US 
Census Bureau, Aug 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/B6ZH-TAMY (noting that from 
1980 to 2010, the use of languages other than English at home increased by 158.2 percent). 
 11 Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, et al, The Asian Population: 2010 *3–4 (US Census Bureau, 
Mar 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/NDZ6-J3KH. 
 12 FHA § 804(a), (b), 82 Stat at 83, codified at 42 USC § 3604(a), (b). 
 13 FHA § 804(c), 82 Stat at 83, codified at 42 USC § 3604(c) (emphases added). 
 14 See United States v Hunter, 459 F2d 205, 210–15 (4th Cir 1972) (holding that  
application of § 3604(c) to newspapers does not violate the First Amendment). See also 
Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at 
the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 Fordham Urban L J 187, 214 (2001). 
 There has been litigation attempting to hold websites like Craigslist liable for discrim-
inatory housing advertisements. See, for example, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law, Inc v Craigslist, Inc, 519 F3d 666, 668–72 (7th Cir 2008). In that case, 
Craigslist managed to escape liability thanks to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 
which states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated  
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” 47 USC § 230(c)(1). 
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when the language of a housing advertisement constitutes dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin.15 Given that the stat-
ute and its accompanying regulations16 are silent as to whether 
notices, statements, or advertisements must appear in a particu-
lar language, several possible conclusions regarding the legality 
of Chinese-language advertisements come to mind. 
First, the exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements 
may be a clear violation of the FHA because language is corre-
lated with national origin, and advertisements in Chinese there-
fore “indicate[ ] a[ ] preference” for people of Chinese origin.17 This 
approach is analogous to the so-called human-models cases, in 
which the exclusive use of white models in housing advertise-
ments was sometimes found to violate § 3604(c).18 
Second, even if these advertisements technically violate the 
FHA, courts may hesitate before imposing liability in light of the 
historical discrimination that pushed Chinese immigrants into 
ethnic enclaves in the first place.19 The overarching legislative 
purpose of the FHA was to combat racial segregation in housing—
particularly, discrimination against African Americans—not to 
penalize residents of ethnic enclaves for advertising in their na-
tive language.20 Thus, a court might disregard the plain meaning 
of § 3604(c) as applied to Chinese landlords and publishers.21 
 
 15 One unreported case addressed the possibility that Spanish-language advertise-
ments might indicate a discriminatory preference for Hispanics. See Guevara v UMH 
Properties, Inc, 2014 WL 5488918, *6 (WD Tenn) (concluding that “[p]laintiffs’ allegation 
that Defendant only advertised in Spanish language media outlets is sufficient to state a 
claim because it . . . denies non-Spanish speaking segments of the housing market, who 
are overwhelmingly non-Hispanic, information about housing opportunities”), citing 24 
CFR § 100.75. 
 16 See 24 CFR § 100.75. 
 17 42 USC § 3604(c). For a proponent of this view, see R. Ian Forrest, Note, Kàn Bú 
Tài Dǒng: The Fair Housing Act, Language Discrimination, and Chinese Classifieds, 101 
Ky L J 839, 858–59 (2013). But see note 174 (critiquing the assumption that language is 
correlated with national origin). 
 18 See Part II.C.3. 
 19 On the rise of Chinatowns as a response to racism and exclusion, see generally 
Sucheng Chan, ed, Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882–
1943 (Temple 1991); Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California 
(Illinois 1973). Of course, the formation of ethnic enclaves was not due entirely to exclusion; 
recent immigrants also sought out these communities because of family connections and 
cultural familiarity. See notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 20 See notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 21 The classic prototype of this argument is Holy Trinity Church v United States, 143 
US 457, 459 (1892) (“[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within 
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”). This 
purposivist approach to statutory interpretation has fallen out of favor due to the growing 
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Finally, such advertisements may not violate the FHA at all, 
unless the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, such as  
African Americans or Hispanics. While this asymmetrical ap-
proach22 has some normative appeal, it is not a promising option 
under current law, which makes clear that anyone with standing 
may bring an FHA claim.23 
This Comment makes two significant contributions to the 
nascent literature on minority-language housing advertisements. 
First, I identify a series of factors that courts should consider 
when faced with such advertisements, including: (1) the de-
mographics of the relevant community, (2) the national origin and 
language abilities of the landlord and prospective renter or buyer, 
(3) whether an “ordinary reader”24 would consider the advertise-
ment to indicate a preference on the basis of national origin,  
and (4) translation costs. The goal of this approach is to strike a 
 
influence of textualism. See, for example, Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textu-
alism, 106 Colum L Rev 1, 29–30, 36 (2006) (noting that “few judges or scholars today 
espouse the strong purposivism that textualists set out to discredit two decades ago,” but 
arguing that the two schools of thought are actually converging). But see Zuni Public 
School District No 89 v Department of Education, 550 US 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for declining to apply the plain meaning of a federal labor statute: 
“[T]oday Church of the Holy Trinity arises, Phoenix-like, from the ashes.”).  
 See also Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 Wm & Mary 
L Rev 1521, 1534 (2003) (arguing that private communities’ use of “ethnically-conscious 
preferential practices . . . should, for the most part, be allowed to exist within the ‘pale’ 
twilight of the law”). 
 22 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 
Wis L Rev 69, 73 (describing the asymmetrical approach as “oppos[ing] only those uses of 
a protected trait that harm the disadvantaged group, and thus favor[ing] an asymmetrical 
ban that would allow only members of the disadvantaged group to utilize the law”). See 
also Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 BC L Rev 1085, 1123–29 (2017) 
(arguing that asymmetrical approaches to discrimination law may be appropriate in some 
situations). 
 23 See, for example, Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 212 
(1972) (holding that a white tenant had standing to sue a landlord for discrimination 
against nonwhites); Mayers v Ridley, 465 F2d 630, 640–41 (DC Cir 1972) (en banc) (recog-
nizing that white home sellers were harmed by racially restrictive covenants recorded on 
their property deeds); Guevara, 2014 WL 5488918 at *5–6 (concluding that Hispanic plain-
tiffs stated a claim for a violation of § 3604(c) when their landlord advertised extensively 
in Spanish-language print and radio, thereby allegedly “depriving them of the benefits of 
a racially and culturally diverse environment”). See also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L 
J at 216–19 (cited in note 14). 
 Similarly, in employment discrimination law, courts have made clear that protection 
from race and sex discrimination is symmetrical under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. See McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co, 427 US 273, 280, 286–87 (1976) 
(race); Martinez v El Paso County, 710 F2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir 1983) (sex). 
 24 The “ordinary reader” standard was first introduced in Hunter, 459 F2d at 215. 
See Part II.A.3. 
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workable balance between minority-language advertisements’ in-
clusive effect with respect to Chinese landlords and prospective 
residents, for example, while acknowledging Congress’s intent to 
combat exclusionary housing messages by passing § 3604(c). 
Going further, this Comment draws on antisubordination 
theory25 to argue that courts should interpret the FHA as a legis-
lative scheme that protects minority communities’ housing rights, 
rather than uncritically mandating integration and assimila-
tion.26 Minority-language communities generate network effects 
by bringing together speakers and readers of a common lan-
guage.27 To avoid unnecessarily jettisoning these benefits, courts 
should construe § 3604(c) to permit advertisements that convey 
the existence of a language community.28 Such advertisements 
signal that individuals who may be unwelcome elsewhere are wel-
come in the community, but do not necessarily “indicate[ ]” that 
nonspeakers and nonreaders are unwelcome.29 
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides essential 
background on Chinatowns and the FHA. Part II deconstructs the 
provisions of § 3604(c), noting the lack of clear guidance from the 
applicable regulations and case law. Finally, Part III proposes 
factors that a court should consider when faced with a minority-
language advertisement, and argues that the FHA should be in-
terpreted to reflect antisubordination goals more generally. 
 
 25 On the antisubordination principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal  
Protection Clause, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs 107, 157 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits laws or official practices that “aggravate[ ] . . . the subordinate position 
of a specially disadvantaged group”). 
 26 For more on antisubordination theory, see Part II.D. 
 27 See Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network  
Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479, 483 (1998) (“[A] network effect exists where purchas-
ers find a good more valuable as additional purchasers buy the same good.”). For example, 
a single telephone has no communicative utility on its own but becomes more valuable as 
other consumers purchase telephones. Id at 488–89. Similarly, language has “negligible 
inherent value to the first speaker and increasing value over the range of additional  
speakers.” Id at 489. See also Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 
53 Am U L Rev 1259, 1269 (2004) (observing that network analysis has implications be-
yond economics). 
 28 By contrast, housing advertisements featuring exclusively white models send a 
message of racial preference without a plausible nondiscriminatory justification, and 
therefore present a stronger case for § 3604(c) liability. See Part II.C.3. 
 29 42 USC § 3604(c). 
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I.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 This Part begins with a brief overview of the history of  
American Chinatowns and Chicago’s Chinatown in particular. No-
tably, Chicago’s Chinatown is one of the only Chinatowns in the 
United States that is still growing.30 The neighborhood is situated 
in close proximity with other minority neighborhoods, such as 
Bronzeville and Pilsen, which are predominantly African Ameri-
can and Hispanic, respectively.31 As such, Chicago’s Chinatown 
provides a valuable case study for potential litigation concerning 
minority-language advertisements. Part I.B discusses the pas-
sage of the FHA, the legislative history of § 3604(c), and how the 
FHA is enforced. 
A. Chinatowns 
Chinatowns first emerged on the West Coast in the mid- 
nineteenth century, when many Chinese immigrants came to the 
United States in search of work opportunities as railroad laborers 
and miners.32 In the face of discrimination, harassment, and vio-
lence, Chinese immigrants sought refuge in ethnic enclaves.33 
 
 30 Anna Clark, The Unlikely Boom of Chicago’s Chinatown (Next City, Feb 22, 2016), 
archived at https://perma.cc/GT7Y-JS8G. By contrast, New York and San Francisco’s  
Chinatowns are shrinking. See Bonnie Tsui, The End of Chinatown (The Atlantic, Dec 
2011), archived at https://perma.cc/NDT7-9BVM. On the problem of gentrification in east 
coast Chinatowns, see Bethany Y. Li, et al, Chinatown Then and Now: Gentrification in 
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia (Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
2013), archived at https://perma.cc/BG7Z-TF8Q. 
 31 For a map of Chicago’s nine districts and seventy-seven community areas, see  
Chicago Neighborhoods (The Chicago 77, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UPH2-7WA3. 
For brief descriptions of the cultural and ethnic identities of these neighborhoods, see  
Explore Chicago’s 77 Neighborhoods (Choose Chicago, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
6S3G-FG93. 
 32 Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California at 12–15, 24 (cited in note 
19); Huping Ling, Chinese Chicago: Race, Transnational Migration, and Community Since 
1870 29–30 (Stanford 2012). For an excellent transnational history of Chinese migration 
to and from the United States, see generally Madeline Yuan-yin Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, 
Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South 
China, 1882–1943 (Stanford 2000). 
 33 See L. Eve Armentrout Ma, Chinatown Organizations and the Anti-Chinese Move-
ment, 1882–1914, in Chan, ed, Entry Denied 147, 160–66 (cited in note 19). Professor Eve 
Ma notes that American Chinatowns were products of a much larger phenomenon of “over-
seas Chinese,” who formed similar communities in Southeast Asia, Canada, and Latin 
America. Id at 160–61. Hence, the profusion of Chinese self-help organizations “[cannot] 
be attributed solely to an attempt by Chinese in the United States to protect themselves 
from the racism of non-Chinese Americans.” Id at 162 (emphasis added). 
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Chinatowns provided vital social services and community net-
works otherwise unavailable to immigrants,34 particularly after 
the Chinese Exclusion Act35 erected legal barriers to citizenship.36 
At the same time, Chinese immigrants often had nowhere else to 
go due to intense housing and labor discrimination.37 
The first Chinese immigrants came to Chicago from  
California in the 1870s.38 Chicago’s Chinatown was originally  
located in the Loop on Clark Street between Van Buren and  
Harrison Streets.39 In the 1910s, rising rents drove Chinese resi-
dents and businesses out of the Loop to the Near South Side. The 
construction of the Dan Ryan and Stevenson highways in the 
1950s cut the new “South Chinatown” in half and led to a severe 
housing shortage, but the community recovered and eventually 
outgrew its previous boundaries.40 Today, the neighborhood is 
concentrated at the intersection of Cermak Road and Wentworth 
Avenue.41 Chinatown’s population increased by 26 percent be-
tween 2000 and 2010,42 and many Chinese immigrants now reside 
in nearby Bridgeport and McKinley Park.43 
Chinatown’s expansion into other neighborhoods has not 
been without tension. In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese American 
developers began building townhomes in Bridgeport that were 
 
 34 Id at 147 (“Chinese exclusion in particular, and the anti-Chinese movement in 
general, forced [Chinatown] social organizations to come to terms with organized, institu-
tionalized opposition to the very presence of Chinese.”). 
 35 Pub L No 47-126, 22 Stat 58 (1882). In addition to prohibiting the immigration of 
new Chinese laborers, the Act barred Chinese immigrants who were already working in 
the United States from obtaining citizenship. Id at 61. See also Mae M. Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 64 (Princeton 2004). 
 36 Chinese immigrants were not passive in the face of exclusion. See Charles J. 
McClain and Laurene Wu McClain, The Chinese Contribution to the Development of  
American Law, in Chan, Entry Denied 3, 21 (cited in note 19) (arguing that Chinese liti-
gants during the exclusion era made significant contributions to due process and equal 
protection jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 37 See Braden Goyette, How Racism Created America’s Chinatowns (Huffington 
Post, Dec 6, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/F2PC-T2MG. On the transformation of 
stereotypes about Asian Americans from the “yellow peril” to the “model minority,” see 
generally Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model 
Minority (Princeton 2013). 
 38 Ling, Chinese Chicago at 30–32 (cited in note 32). 
 39 Id at 32, 52 (providing an illustration). 
 40 Id at 216–17. 
 41 Id at 53, 218–20. See also Clark, The Unlikely Boom of Chicago’s Chinatown (cited 
in note 30). 
 42 Clark, The Unlikely Boom of Chicago’s Chinatown (cited in note 30). 
 43 Eng, Why Chicago’s Chinatown Is Practically Invisible (cited in note 1). On the 
rising Chinese population in Bridgeport, see Ling, Chinese Chicago at 220–22 (cited in 
note 32). 
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marketed specifically toward Chinese immigrants and Chinese 
Americans.44 White residents have sometimes responded to the 
growing Chinese population with violence, including assaults on 
Chinese American teenagers and an arson attack on a Chinese 
restaurant in Bridgeport.45 
At the very least, demographic shifts on Chicago’s south side 
will increase the likelihood that people who cannot read or speak 
Chinese will encounter advertisements that they do not under-
stand. Non-Chinese prospective residents may turn to the FHA 
as a tool to challenge the exclusive use of Chinese-language hous-
ing advertisements. The next Section provides historical context 
for the FHA’s passage and explains how it is enforced. 
B. The Fair Housing Act 
The FHA followed a series of landmark civil rights achieve-
ments, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act46 and the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act.47 Congress had been considering fair housing legisla-
tion since 1966,48 but it was not until 1968, in the wake of Dr. 
Martin Luther King’s assassination and the release of the Kerner 
Commission Report,49 that Congress ultimately passed the FHA.50 
The legislative history indicates that promoting racial integration 
in housing was a major goal of the FHA.51 As enacted, the FHA 
 
 44 Ling, Chinese Chicago at 221 (cited in note 32). 
 45 Id at 221–22. See also Jenny J. Chen, First-Ever Tracker of Hate Crimes Against 
Asian-Americans Launched (NPR, Feb 17, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Y9BQ 
-ELHT (observing that “national statistics on hate crimes against [Asian Americans and 
Pacific Islanders] are still scanty,” but reporting growing concern in recent years). 
 46 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000a et seq. 
 47 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101 et seq. 
 48 See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 197–98 & n 34 (cited in note 14), citing 
Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Further Legislation to 
Strengthen Civil Rights, 1966 Pub Papers 461, 467–69. 
 49 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders *1 (1968), archived at https://perma.cc/XDP3-UK8M.  
The Report painted a grim portrait of an increasingly segregated nation, warning that the 
United States was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and  
unequal.” 
 50 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 194 (cited in note 14). See also Texas  
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc,  
135 S Ct 2507, 2516 (2015) (“Congress responded [to the assassination of Dr. King] by 
adopting the Kerner Commission’s recommendation and passing the Fair Housing Act.”). 
 51 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 212–13 (cited in note 14). 
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prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, na-
tional origin, and religion, but subsequent amendments added 
sex, disability, and familial status as protected categories.52 
Section 3608(d) of the FHA contains a cryptic instruction that 
“[a]ll executive departments and agencies shall administer their 
programs and activities relating to housing and urban develop-
ment in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this  
title.”53 The provision applies to state and local governments that 
receive federal grants and to public housing agencies.54 The  
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) codified 
its regulatory interpretation of this “affirmatively furthering fair 
housing” (AFFH) requirement in 2015,55 but the Department an-
nounced in 2018 that it is in the process of amending the rule.56 
Although the future of AFFH is uncertain, the rule underscores 
the FHA’s goal of achieving more integrated communities. 
1. Legislative history of § 3604(c). 
As Part II will show, the text of § 3604(c) is ambiguous re-
garding its application to minority-language advertisements. 
When the text of a statute is unclear, it is appropriate to turn to 
the legislative history for guidance.57 Yet the legislative history of 
 
 52 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-383, § 808, 88 
Stat 633, 728; Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-430 § 800, 102 Stat 
1619, 1619–20. 
 53 FHA § 808(d), 82 Stat at 84–85, codified at 42 USC § 3608(d) (emphasis added). 
 54 24 CFR §§ 5.152, 5.154(b). 
 55 See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Affirmatively Furthering 
Fair Housing, 80 Fed Reg 42272, 42272–73 (2015), amending 24 CFR Parts 5, 91, 92, 570, 
574, 576, 903. 
 56 See HUD to Revise Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule (National Law  
Review, Aug 14, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YJ4J-JM7L; Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and  
Enhancements, 83 Fed Reg 40713 (2018), amending 24 CFR Parts 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 
903 (inviting public comment on amendments to the AFFH rule). 
 As currently written, 24 CFR § 5.150 requires HUD grant recipients to “[take] mean-
ingful actions to overcome historic patterns of segregation, promote fair housing choice, 
and foster inclusive communities that are free from discrimination.” Specifically, 24 CFR 
§ 5.152 defines “affirmatively furthering fair housing” in part as “replacing segregated liv-
ing patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns” and “transforming ra-
cially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of opportunity.” As of this 
writing, HUD has suspended assessments of fair housing submissions. 
 57 See, for example, Exxon Mobil Corp v Allapattah Services, Inc, 545 US 546, 568 
(2005) (“[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or 
any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation 
only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding 
of otherwise ambiguous terms.”). 
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§ 3604(c) is sparse,58 more so than the rest of the FHA.59 At least 
one senator expressed concern that the section might violate the 
First Amendment right of free speech,60 but the section otherwise 
generated little debate.61 As a result, Professor Robert Schwemm 
observes that “the meaning of this provision must be derived al-
most exclusively from the words of the statute, unaided by addi-
tional materials.”62 Indeed, when the Supreme Court was first 
tasked with interpreting the FHA, the Court agreed that “[t]he 
legislative history of the Act is not too helpful.”63 Nonetheless, 
Schwemm argues that “there is a good deal of evidence [Congress] 
was aware of the implications of the broad language it chose to use 
and intended this language to have its full and natural meaning.”64 
In the absence of much legislative history, some commenta-
tors have turned to contemporaneous antidiscrimination laws.65 
Specifically, § 3604(c)’s language closely parallels that of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act,66 which prohibits employment discrimina-
tion “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”67 
Section 3604(c) differs from Title VII, however, in that it does not 
require proof of either intentional discrimination or disparate im-
pact.68 Rather, a notice, statement, or advertisement need only 
“indicate” a discriminatory preference to an “ordinary reader” or 
 
 58 See Mayers, 465 F2d at 633 (“Although the legislative history of this section is 
sparse, it indicates beyond doubt that, as the words themselves suggest, Congress in-
tended to go beyond advertising to reach other sorts of ‘notices’ and ‘statements’ as well.”). 
 59 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 197–200 (cited in note 14). For more on the 
legislative history of the FHA, see id at 194 n 15 (collecting citations). 
 60 Civil Rights Act of 1967, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S 1026, S 1318, S 1359, S 1362, 
S 1462, HR 2516 and HR 10805 (Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967), 90th Cong 127 (1967) 
(statement of Sen Ervin) (opposing the bill because “[f]reedom of speech includes the right 
to express a preference”). 
 61 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 199 (cited in note 14). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 210 (1972). 
 64 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 211 (cited in note 14). 
 65 See, for example, id at 206 (observing that “many of the substantive provisions of 
the [Johnson] Administration’s [original] fair housing proposal, including its prohibition 
against discriminatory ads, notices, and statements, closely track the language adopted in 
Title VII”); Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 841 (cited in note 17) (“The lack of clarity in the 
legislative history has required frequent reference to sister statutes like Title VII, whose 
debates are, at times, much more voluminous and instructive.”), citing Trafficante, 409 
US at 205. 
 66 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 206–07 & nn 78–79 (cited in note 14). 
 67 42 USC § 2000e-2. 
 68 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2516–17 (noting that the Court has long 
recognized disparate-impact claims under Title VII). 
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“ordinary listener.”69 In this way, § 3604(c) operates as a form of 
strict liability, such that intent to discriminate is not required.70 
However, evidence of discriminatory intent may weigh in favor  
of finding that an advertisement indicates a discriminatory  
preference.71 
2. Enforcement. 
The FHA permits both government and private enforce-
ment.72 HUD has primary responsibility for interpreting, admin-
istering, and enforcing the FHA. Under § 3610, HUD receives 
complaints from “aggrieved person[s],”73 or HUD may file its own 
complaint.74 After receiving a complaint, HUD will prepare an in-
vestigative report and attempt to reach a conciliation agree-
ment.75 HUD may then refer the matter to the Department of  
Justice (DOJ) for enforcement.76 HUD may also refer the matter 
to state or local housing authorities.77 
In some cases, the Attorney General will also commence a 
civil action.78 Such an action is appropriate 
[w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to  
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a 
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any 
of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of 
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this 
 
 69 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 223 (cited in note 14). 
 70 See id at 308 (“[Section] 3604(c) may be violated without intent to discriminate.”). 
See also Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law & Litigation § 15:1 (Thomson 
Reuters 2014). 
 71 See, for example, Jancik v Department of Housing and Urban Development, 44 F3d 
553, 556 (7th Cir 1995) (“[E]vidence of such [discriminatory] intent is not irrelevant. Evi-
dence that the author or speaker intended his or her words to indicate a prohibited pref-
erence obviously bears on the question of whether the words in fact do so.”). 
 72 But see Trafficante, 409 US at 211 (noting that because “the enormity of the task 
of assuring fair housing makes the role of the Attorney General . . . minimal, the main 
generating force must be private suits”). 
 73 42 USC § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). See also 42 USC § 3602(i)(1)–(2) (defining an “aggrieved 
person” as any person who “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice” or “believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that 
is about to occur”). 
 74 For more on the complaint process, which is overseen by the Office of Fair Housing 
and Equal Opportunity (FHEO), see Learn About the FHEO Complaint and Investigation 
Process (HUD), archived at https://perma.cc/34YU-L7YG. 
 75 42 USC § 3610(b). 
 76 42 USC § 3610(c), (e). 
 77 42 USC § 3610(f). 
 78 42 USC § 3614. 
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subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public 
importance.79 
Alternatively, the Attorney General may take a case upon referral 
from the HUD Secretary.80 
HUD and DOJ do not bring the vast majority of fair housing 
claims. According to the National Fair Housing Alliance, HUD 
processed just 4.5 percent of all housing discrimination com-
plaints in 2017, while DOJ handled a paltry 0.01 percent.81 By 
contrast, nonprofit fair housing organizations handled 71.3 per-
cent of complaints, and state and local agencies funded by the fed-
eral Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) processed approx-
imately 23.9 percent.82 Very few complaints proceed to litigation. 
In 2017, HUD charged only nineteen cases and DOJ’s Housing 
and Civil Enforcement Section brought just forty-one cases, of 
which twenty-four were pattern or practice cases.83 
Individuals also have a private right of action in state or fed-
eral court.84 Plaintiffs may seek preventive relief,85 monetary 
damages,86 civil penalties,87 and attorneys’ fees (to a prevailing 
party other than the US government).88 Standing is very broad. 
In Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co,89 two white  
tenants sued their landlord, alleging that they had “lost the social 
benefits of living in an integrated community,” “missed business 
and professional advantages,” and were “stigmatized as residents 
of a white ghetto.”90 Concluding that the plaintiffs had standing, 
the Supreme Court interpreted “aggrieved persons” using “a gen-
erous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same 
 
 79 42 USC § 3614(a) (emphasis added). 
 80 See 42 USC § 3610(c), (e), or (g). 
 81 Shanti Abedin, et al, Making Every Neighborhood a Place of Opportunity: 2018 
Fair Housing Trends Report *49 (National Fair Housing Alliance, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/P2H3-MQZL. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id at *56, 59. I have not been able to locate specific data on how many of those 
cases involved § 3604(c) claims. 
 84 42 USC § 3612(a), (o). Alternatively, aggrieved persons are entitled to a hearing 
before an administrative law judge. 42 USC § 3612(b). 
 85 42 USC § 3614(d)(1)(A). 
 86 42 USC § 3614(d)(1)(B). 
 87 42 USC § 3614(d)(1)(C). 
 88 42 USC § 3614(d)(2). 
 89 409 US 205 (1972). 
 90 Id at 208 (quotation marks omitted). 
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housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the man-
agement of those facilities within the coverage of the statute.”91 
Later, in Havens Realty Corp v Coleman,92 the Court held that 
standing under the FHA extends to the full limits of Article III.93 
In that case, one of the plaintiffs was a nonprofit organization that 
sought damages for resources spent counteracting the defendants’ 
alleged racial steering practices.94 The Court concluded that the re-
sulting “drain on the organization’s resources” was a “concrete and 
demonstrable injury” sufficient to confer standing.95 This line of 
cases indicates that “it is well established that a minority home 
seeker subjected to a § 3604(c) violative statement by a housing 
provider is entitled to sue the provider for the psychic injuries 
caused by that statement.”96 
* * * 
This Part has provided historical context for thinking about 
how the FHA should apply in minority-language communities in 
general and Chicago’s Chinatown in particular. As Part I.B ex-
plained, the legislative history does not provide much for courts 
to go on, and § 3604(c) claims are most likely to come from private 
plaintiffs rather than government agencies. These considerations 
set the stage for a closer examination of § 3604(c) itself. 
II.  BREAKING DOWN § 3604(c) 
 In order to understand this Comment’s novel interpretation 
of the FHA as applied to minority-language advertisements, this 
Part unpacks the statutory provision at issue. First, Part II.A sets 
 
 91 Id at 210, 212. 
 92 455 US 363 (1982). 
 93 Id at 372–73. Standing derives from Article III, § 1 of the Constitution, which 
states that federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.” 
See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559–61 (1992) (outlining the three  
minimum requirements for constitutional standing: injury in fact, traceability, and  
redressability). 
 94 Havens Realty, 455 US at 368–69. 
 95 Id at 379. See also Spann v Colonial Village, Inc, 899 F2d 24, 27–31 (DC Cir 1990) 
(holding that an equal housing nonprofit had standing to sue under § 3604(c) in a case 
alleging that racially discriminatory advertisements imposed burdens on the nonprofit’s 
limited resources), citing Havens, 455 US at 379. 
 96 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 302 (cited in note 14). But see Bank of  
America Corp v City of Miami, 137 S Ct 1296, 1304–05 (2017) (holding that the city had 
standing to sue on the basis of lost tax revenue and added municipal expenses because 
those harms fell within the FHA’s “zone of interests,” but declining to revisit the broad 
view of standing articulated in Trafficante and Havens). 
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out the elements of a § 3604(c) claim. Part II.B then demonstrates 
the lack of clear regulatory guidance. Given the dearth of cases 
addressing the language in which a housing advertisement  
appears, Part II.C highlights potentially analogous lines of FHA 
cases, including national origin discrimination, racial steering, 
and human models. Finally, Part II.D discusses theoretical con-
siderations informing my proposed solution in Part III. 
A. Elements of a § 3604(c) Claim 
There are three basic elements of a § 3604(c) claim.97 First, 
the defendant must have “ma[de], print[ed], or publish[ed], or 
cause[d] to be made, printed, or published” a “notice, statement, 
or advertisement.”98 Second, the statement must have been made 
“with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”99 Liability does 
not result if a landlord simply expressed opposition to the FHA in 
general or made a “stray” racial remark.100 Finally, the statement 
must “indicate[ ] a[ ] preference, limitation, or discrimination” 
based on a protected category or “an intention to make any such 
preference, limitation, or discrimination.”101 
The remainder of this Section highlights several key points 
in § 3604(c) case law: (1) the provision applies to both landlords 
and publishers of discriminatory statements, (2) discriminatory 
intent is not necessary, and (3) the “ordinary reader” standard  
allows a court to determine whether an advertisement or series 
of advertisements violates the statute. These principles are essen-
tial for determining whether a minority-language advertisement 
violates the FHA. 
 
 97 See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 213–16 (cited in note 14). Schwemm 
identifies four elements of a claim, but the second and third elements may be combined. 
Id at 214. 
 98 42 USC § 3604(c). This Comment focuses primarily on advertisements, but state-
ments may also include oral statements, typically by a landlord or her agent to a prospec-
tive tenant. See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 214–15 (cited in note 14). See also 
24 CFR § 100.75(b) (“The prohibitions in [§ 3604(c)] shall apply to all written or oral no-
tices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling.”). 
 99 42 USC § 3604(c). 
 100 See, for example, Harris v Itzhaki, 183 F3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir 1999) (noting that 
if a landlord’s discriminatory statement is merely a “stray” remark “unrelated to the deci-
sional process [and therefore] insufficient to show discrimination,” then the landlord is not 
liable). See also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 215 & n 119 (cited in note 14). 
 101 42 USC § 3604(c). 
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1. Applicability to landlords and publishers. 
Courts were initially uncertain whether § 3604(c) imposed  
liability only on landlords, or if newspapers that published  
housing advertisements could also be liable. In one of the first 
cases to address this ambiguity, United States v Hunter,102 the US  
Attorney General sought to enjoin a local newspaper’s publication 
of an advertisement for a basement apartment in a “white 
home.”103 The Fourth Circuit held that “both landlords and news-
papers are within the section’s reach” based on the plain meaning 
of the statute, and that the advertisement clearly indicated a ra-
cial preference.104 In addition, the court concluded that § 3604(c) 
did not contravene the First Amendment because Congress may 
regulate commercial advertising.105 Finally, the court found no 
due process violation, in part because there is no “Mrs. Murphy” 
exception to § 3604(c).106 Sections 3604(a) and (b) of the FHA al-
low private, small-scale landlords (like the apocryphal Mrs.  
Murphy) to discriminate in who they sell or rent to, but § 3604(c) 
does not contain such an exemption.107 This distinction means 
that Chinese landlords who could otherwise escape liability under 
§ 3604(a) and (b) may face liability under § 3604(c) for the exclu-
sive use of Chinese-language advertisements. 
2. Discriminatory intent is not necessary. 
Unlike other substantive provisions of the FHA, which re-
quire a showing of discriminatory intent or disparate impact,108 
§ 3604(c) establishes liability if an advertisement “indicates” that 
 
 102 459 F2d 205 (4th Cir 1972). 
 103 Id at 209. 
 104 Id at 210, 215. 
 105 Id at 211–13. But see National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra, 
138 S Ct 2361, 2371–72 (2018) (imposing limits on the government’s ability to regulate 
commercial speech in general and compelled speech in particular). 
 106 Hunter, 459 F2d at 213–14. On the Mrs. Murphy exception, see 42 USC 
§ 3603(b)(1)–(2) (stating that § 3604 does not apply to landlords who own no more than 
three single-family homes, or who rent rooms or units in dwellings that may be occupied 
by up to four families, provided that the landlords also live in the dwellings). 
 107 See 42 USC § 3603(b) (“[n]othing in section 3604 of this title (other than  
subsection (c)) shall apply” to Mrs. Murphy landlords) (emphasis added). See also Schwemm, 
29 Fordham Urban L J at 191–92 (cited in note 14) (noting that, ironically, only honest rac-
ists are punished because Mrs. Murphy is still free to discriminate, so long as she does not 
cite a race-based reason for refusing to a rent to someone). 
 108 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2525 (holding that disparate-impact 
claims are cognizable under the FHA). 
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a particular group is preferred or not preferred.109 Effectively, this 
means that § 3604(c) is a strict liability statute.110 Most FHA 
claims use discriminatory statements as evidence of a defendant’s 
illegal motive under § 3604(a) or (b), rather than as the basis for 
a standalone claim.111 In fact, plaintiffs sometimes neglect to seek 
liability under § 3604(c) at all, even if an advertisement or state-
ment is obviously discriminatory.112 
3. The “ordinary reader” standard. 
The FHA does not specify how to determine whether an  
advertisement is discriminatory.113 Attempting to resolve this  
ambiguity, the Fourth Circuit in Hunter introduced the concept 
of an “ordinary reader.”114 Specifically, the court considered 
whether “the natural interpretation of the advertisements,” to an 
ordinary reader, “indicate[s] a racial preference in the acceptance 
of tenants.”115 Other appellate courts have subsequently adopted 
and expanded upon this approach.116 
Most notably, in Ragin v New York Times,117 black prospec-
tive homeowners sued The New York Times, alleging that its 
housing advertisements featured almost exclusively white mod-
els.118 The complaint further alleged that “the few blacks repre-
sented are usually depicted as building maintenance employees, 
doormen, entertainers, sports figures, small children or cartoon 
characters.”119 The Second Circuit denied the newspaper’s motion 
 
 109 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 215 (cited in note 14). Compare 42 USC 
§ 3604(c), with 42 USC §§ 3604(a)–(b), (d)–(f)(2), 3605, 3606. 
 110 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 216 (cited in note 14). 
 111 Id at 251. 
 112 Id at 255–60. Professor Schwemm urges fair housing litigators to use the provision 
more aggressively, rather than as a backup plan when a Mrs. Murphy exception would 
otherwise shield a landlord from liability. Id at 262–63. 
 113 See Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc v Connor Group, 725 F3d 571, 577 (6th 
Cir 2013) (“The Fair Housing Act’s language is purposely broad and ‘the statute and reg-
ulations create no fixed and immutable rules to determine whether an advertisement is 
discriminatory.’”), quoting Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc v Cincinnati Enquirer, 
943 F2d 644, 647 (6th Cir 1991). 
 114 Hunter, 459 F2d at 215. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See, for example, Jancik v Department of Housing and Urban Development, 44 F3d 
553, 556 (7th Cir 1995); Ragin v New York Times, 923 F2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir 1991); 
Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc, 943 F2d at 646. 
 117 923 F2d 995 (2d Cir 1991). 
 118 Id at 998. 
 119 Id. 
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to dismiss, concluding that § 3604(c) is violated “if an ad for hous-
ing suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular race is pre-
ferred or dispreferred for the housing in question.”120 The discrim-
inatory message need not be as inflammatory as a “swastika or 
burning cross,” so long as the ad “would discourage an ordinary 
reader of a particular race from answering it.”121 At the same time, 
“[t]he ordinary reader is neither the most suspicious nor the most 
insensitive of our citizenry.”122 Thus, “[a]n ad depicting a single 
model or couple of one race that is run only two or three times 
would seem, absent some other direct evidence of an intentional 
racial message, outside Section 3604(c)’s prohibitions as a matter 
of law.”123 
Circuit courts are divided as to whether an advertisement 
must discourage an ordinary reader from responding, or if merely 
indicating a discriminatory preference is sufficient to violate 
§ 3604(c). In the Second and Seventh Circuits, “preference” is read 
to “describe any ad that would discourage an ordinary reader of a 
particular race from answering it.”124 By contrast, the Sixth Cir-
cuit expressly rejected this approach in Miami Valley Fair Hous-
ing Center, Inc v Connor Group.125 Instead, the Sixth Circuit ana-
lyzes the message alone without considering whether it  
discourages a reader from responding to the ad.126 Under the no-
discouragement-required interpretation, anyone who encounters 
a discriminatory message may have standing to sue. 
The ambiguity surrounding the application of the “ordinary 
reader” standard cuts two ways. On the one hand, courts may 
struggle to assess the strength of a § 3604(c) claim—an “ordinary 
reader” is arguably as nebulous as a “reasonable person.” On the 
other hand, as Part III explains, the standard is capacious enough 
 
 120 Id at 999 (emphasis added). 
 121 Ragin, 923 F2d at 999–1000. See also Jancik, 44 F3d at 556 (“[C]ourts have not 
required that ads jump out at the reader with their offending message.”). 
 122 Ragin, 923 F2d at 1002. 
 123 Id (emphasis added). See also Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc, 943 F2d at 
648 (adopting the “ordinary reader” standard, but concluding that a single ad featuring a 
white model, standing alone, would not violate § 3604(c) as a matter of law); Spann v  
Colonial Village, Inc, 662 F Supp 541, 546 (DDC 1987) (holding that “absent a showing of 
intent to indicate a racial preference or of other extrinsic circumstances revelatory of a 
racial preference, real estate advertisements do not violate the [FHA] merely because mod-
els of a particular race are not used in one ad or a series of ads”). 
 124 Ragin, 923 F2d at 999–1000 (emphasis added). See also Jancik, 44 F3d at 556 
(adopting the Second Circuit’s approach in Ragin). 
 125 725 F3d 571 (6th Cir 2013). 
 126 Id at 577–78 (“We decline to incorporate the discourage language into our  
ordinary-reader analysis.”). 
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to allow for creative arguments in light of the FHA’s legislative 
purpose and antisubordination theory. 
B. Lack of Regulatory Guidance 
Like the text of the statute itself, the relevant subsection of 
the Code of Federal Regulations does not provide much clarity re-
garding the language in which advertisements should appear to 
comply with the FHA. 24 CFR § 100.75(b) states that the FHA 
applies to “all written or oral notices or statements by a person 
engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling,” indicating that word-
of-mouth advertising in Chinese may run afoul of the FHA.127 
“Written notices and statements include any applications, flyers, 
brochures, deeds, signs, banners, posters, billboards or any docu-
ments used with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”128 
Furthermore, “[d]iscriminatory notices, statements and ad-
vertisements include, but are not limited to” the following: 
(1) Using words, phrases, photographs, illustrations, 
symbols or forms which convey that dwellings are 
available or not available to a particular group of 
persons because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin. 
(2) Expressing to agents, brokers, employees, prospective 
sellers or renters or any other persons a preference for or 
limitation on any purchaser or renter because of race, 
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
origin of such persons. 
(3) Selecting media or locations for advertising the sale or 
rental of dwellings which deny particular segments of the 
housing market information about housing opportunities 
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin. 
  
 
 127 24 CFR § 100.75(b) (emphasis added). See also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J 
at 214–15 (cited in note 14). For word-of-mouth advertising in the context of employment-
discrimination claims under Title VII, see, for example, EEOC v Consolidated Service  
Systems, 989 F2d 233, 234 (7th Cir 1993). 
 128 24 CFR § 100.75(b). 
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(4) Refusing to publish advertising for the sale or rental of 
dwellings or requiring different charges or terms for 
such advertising because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin.129 
Each of these subsections could present problems for land-
lords and newspapers that exclusively use Chinese-language ad-
vertisements. For example, under subsection (1), a plaintiff might 
argue that Chinese characters are “words” or “symbols” conveying 
that “dwellings are available” only to persons of Chinese de-
scent.130 Under subsection (2), Chinese-language advertisements 
might implicitly “[e]xpress[ ]” a preference for Chinese renters.131 
Under subsection (3), a plaintiff could argue that posting fliers in 
Chinese around Chinatown “den[ies]” other minority groups the 
opportunity to learn about vacancies.132 Finally, under subsec-
tion (4), a landlord or publisher might be liable for “[r]efusing” to 
publish advertisements in languages other than Chinese.133  
Although I have not found cases making these precise claims, the 
growth of Chicago’s Chinatown makes such claims more likely in 
the future. 
HUD has issued guidelines to its regulations indicating that 
the language in which advertisements appear may matter in 
some circumstances. For example, 24 CFR § 100.75(d) refers ad-
vertisers to 24 CFR Part 109, which “describes the matters the 
Department will review in evaluating compliance with the Fair 
Housing Act and in investigating complaints alleging discrimina-
tory housing practices involving advertising.”134 Specifically, HUD 
has stated that “the exclusive use of media catering to the majority 
population in an area, when, in such area, there are also available 
non-English language or other minority media, may have dis-
criminatory impact.”135 Depending on how a court defines an 
“area” and construes the “majority population” in that area,  
Chinese-language classifieds might discriminate against people 
who are not part of the neighborhood’s Chinese majority. In other 
words, the decision to define an area as a particular neighborhood 
as opposed to the city at large will likely change the composition 
 
 129 24 CFR § 100.75(c) (emphases added). 
 130 24 CFR § 100.75(c)(1). 
 131 24 CFR § 100.75(c)(2). 
 132 24 CFR § 100.75(c)(3). 
 133 24 CFR § 100.75(c)(4). 
 134 24 CFR § 100.75(d). 
 135 Previously codified at 24 CFR § 109.25 (emphases added). 
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of the “majority population” in an area, potentially resulting in 
§ 3604(c) liability. 
Part 109 also indicates that the selective geographic place-
ment of advertising may give rise to liability: 
Such selective use may involve the strategic placement of 
billboards; brochure advertisements distributed within a lim-
ited geographic area by hand or in the mail; advertising in 
particular geographic coverage editions of major metropoli-
tan newspapers or in newspapers of limited circulation which 
are mainly advertising vehicles for reaching a particular seg-
ment of the community; or displays or announcements avail-
able only in selected sales offices.136 
Under this guidance, Chinese-language newspapers and other 
publishing outlets could be at risk of liability. 
At least one court has stated that HUD guidelines are enti-
tled to “great weight” when determining whether a § 3604(c)  
violation occurred.137 But in Spann v Colonial Village, Inc,138 the 
District Court for the District of Columbia determined that al- 
though Part 109 gives notice to advertisers about when HUD will 
investigate housing complaints, these guidelines were not meant 
to apply to litigation in court.139 Moreover, Part 109 was removed 
from the CFR in 1996 as part of a regulatory reform initiative.140 
In any event, the guidelines are now several decades old, so it is 
unclear if HUD would still adhere to them today.141 
C. Guidance from Analogous Case Law 
Because there have been no cases involving claims that the 
exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements violates 
 
 136 Previously codified at 24 CFR § 109.25(a) (emphases added). 
 137 See United States v Long, Prentice-Hall Equal Opportunity in Housing Rptr 
¶ 13,631, 14,091 (D SC 1974). See also Trafficante, 409 US at 210 (noting that HUD’s 
construction of “aggrieved persons” under the FHA “is entitled to great weight”). 
 138 662 F Supp 541 (DDC 1987), revd on other grounds, 899 F2d 24, 25–26 (DC  
Cir 1990). 
 139 Spann, 622 F Supp at 545. 
 140 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,  
Regulatory Reinvention, Streamlining of HUD’s Regulations Implementing the Fair  
Housing Act, 61 Fed Reg 14378, 14378–80 (1996), amending 24 CFR Parts 100, 103 and 
removing 24 CFR Part 109. 
 141 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,  
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed Reg 3232, 3308–10 
(1989), amending 24 CFR Parts 14, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 115, and 121. See 
also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 220 & n 142 (cited in note 14). 
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§ 3604(c),142 I have turned to related areas of FHA case law for 
guidance. A court faced with such a claim could look to national 
origin discrimination cases, racial-steering cases, and human-
model cases as potential analogues. However, none of these ap-
proaches maps neatly onto the context of minority-language hous-
ing advertisements. 
1. National origin. 
FHA cases involving allegations of national origin discrimi-
nation are a logical place to start. In Holmgren v Little Village 
Community Reporter,143 a Swedish American plaintiff sought to 
enjoin three Chicago neighborhood newspapers from publishing 
classified advertisements on the basis of national origin discrim-
ination.144 The advertisements expressed a preference for home 
buyers and tenants who spoke languages associated with “Polish, 
Bohemian, Slavi[c], German, Spanish and American” nationali-
ties.145 The defendants argued that the ability to speak a given 
language is not related to national origin, and that speaking a 
common language facilitates proper communication between con-
tracting parties.146 The court rejected that argument, observing 
that “to say that the ability to speak a certain language is not 
related to the country of origin of that language is mere soph-
istry.”147 Ultimately, the court concluded that “ads which indicate 
a preference for a purchaser or a tenant who speaks a particular 
language are unlawful under § 3604(c).”148 While this case might 
seem to suggest that Chinese-language advertisements inher-
ently violate the FHA, it is distinguishable in that the court was 
not considering an ad written in a minority language; rather, the 
 
 142 But see Guevara v UMH Properties, Inc, 2014 WL 5488918 *5–6 (WD Tenn) (con-
cluding that Hispanic residents in a mobile home park stated a claim under § 3604(c) when 
defendants allegedly discouraged African Americans from applying by advertising exclu-
sively in Spanish). 
 143 342 F Supp 512 (ND Ill 1971). 
 144 Id at 513. 
 145 Id at 513 n 1. The advertisements themselves seem to have appeared in English, 
but they specified that prospective buyers and tenants who spoke languages associated 
with the enumerated nationalities were preferred. 
 146 Id at 513. 
 147 Holmgren, 342 F Supp at 513. 
 148 Id. 
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ad indicated an explicit preference for residents of certain ethnic-
ities.149 Thus, Holmgren does not provide clear guidance for ad-
dressing the problem of Chinese-language advertisements. 
More recently, in Housing Rights Center v Donald Sterling 
Corp,150 a group of African American and African Jamaican ten-
ants sued their landlord, Donald Sterling, for national origin dis-
crimination, alleging that Sterling instructed his staff to rent only 
to Korean American tenants because he did not like Hispanic or 
black tenants.151 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defend-
ant’s advertisements featured a Korean flag, thereby indicating a 
preference for Koreans.152 The judge determined that the land-
lord’s use of a Korean flag in an announcement did not violate the 
FHA because an ordinary reader would likely view the flag as 
symbolic of the rental company’s name, “American Korean Land 
Company.”153 Nonetheless, the court enjoined Sterling from using 
the word “Korean” in any of his apartment building names.154 By 
enjoining explicit references to national origin in building names 
but permitting the use of a national symbol in housing announce-
ments, Donald Sterling Corp suggests that Chinese-language ad-
vertisements, as symbols of the existence of a Chinese-language 
community, may not violate § 3604(c). 
2. Racial steering. 
Another potentially useful line of cases concerns advertising 
practices found to have a racial steering effect. The defendant in 
United States v Real Estate One, Inc155 placed advertisements for 
homes in “changing areas” of Detroit in a newspaper with a pre-
dominantly African American readership.156 The court noted that 
this tactic conflicted with the defendant’s usual practice of placing 
advertisements in general circulation newspapers. Accordingly, 
the court ordered the defendant to counterbalance its advertising 
 
 149 Id at 513 n 1. But see Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 854 (cited in note 17) (citing 
Holmgren for the proposition that “language and national origin are correlated closely 
enough to make selecting for a foreign language impermissible discrimination”). Forrest 
concedes, however, that the case does not resolve the question of whether the language in 
which an advertisement is written may implicitly convey a discriminatory message, re-
gardless of the underlying meaning of the text. Id. 
 150 274 F Supp 2d 1129 (CD Cal 2003). 
 151 Id at 1134. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id at 1138. 
 154 Sterling, 274 F Supp 2d at 1138–41. 
 155 433 F Supp 1140 (ED Mich 1977). 
 156 Id at 1151. 
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in the predominantly black newspaper with advertising of the 
same homes in general circulation newspapers.157 
At the same time, courts are sympathetic to marketing  
campaigns intended to encourage integration. For example, the 
Seventh Circuit found no violation of § 3604(a) or (c) in South- 
Suburban Housing Center v Greater South Suburban Board of 
Realtors,158 when a housing center implemented an affirmative 
marketing campaign to attract white residents to Park Forest,  
Illinois.159 Crucially, the campaign aimed to correct the racial im-
balance that resulted when white flight and a wave of foreclosures 
“led to abandoned homes and neighborhood blight.”160 This case 
suggests that advertisements which might superficially appear to 
run afoul of § 3604(c) may nonetheless be permissible when they 
further the broader purposes of the FHA. 
3. Human models. 
The “human-model cases” of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
involved black residents who alleged that real estate advertise-
ments featuring exclusively white models violated § 3604(c).161 
The Ragin case, discussed in Part II.A.3, is one such example.162 
Not all of these suits were successful, however. In Housing  
Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) v Cincinnati Enquirer,163 the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant 
newspaper’s motion to dismiss despite very similar facts to those 
in Ragin.164 Like the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit surmised 
that a single advertisement featuring exclusively white models 
would not likely give rise to liability.165 It differed, however in its 
rejection of an aggregate theory of liability based on multiple ad-
vertisements, concluding that such a theory stretched the statute 
too far.166 
 
 157 Id at 1152. 
 158 935 F2d 868 (7th Cir 1991). 
 159 Id at 884–85. 
 160 Id at 873. 
 161 See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 222–26 (cited in note 14). 
 162 See generally Ragin, 923 F2d 995. See also Ragin v Harry Maclowe Real Estate 
Co, 801 F Supp 1213, 1232 (SDNY 1992) (holding that a corporate leasing agent and owner 
violated § 3604(c) by publishing advertisements for luxury apartments featuring only 
white models), affd in relevant part and revd in part on other grounds, Ragin v Harry 
Maclowe Real Estate Co, 6 F3d 898, 907, 909, 911 (2d Cir 1993). 
 163 943 F2d 644 (6th Cir 1991). 
 164 Id at 645, 654. 
 165 Id at 648. 
 166 Id at 653. 
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Arguably, Chinese characters are the functional equivalent 
of white models in that they project implicit messages about the 
intended residents of a community. But the allegedly discrimina-
tory message that Chinese-language advertisements send is not 
nearly as clear as that of the human-model cases. Moreover, while 
minority-language communities generate network effects by 
bringing together a critical mass of language speakers and read-
ers, racially discriminatory housing advertisements lack such 
benefits.167 This Comment addresses these network effects in 
more detail in Part III.B. 
D. Theoretical Considerations 
As I explained in Part I.B and Parts II.A–C, the typical 
sources of guidance for statutory interpretation—text, legislative 
history, applicable regulations, and case law—do not conclusively 
resolve whether and when minority-language housing advertise-
ments violate the FHA.168 Before proceeding to my proposed solu-
tion, it is worth expanding upon the theoretical considerations in-
forming that solution. 
First, although language is correlated with national origin, it 
is not synonymous with national origin. Obvious examples in-
clude Spanish and French, which are spoken in many countries 
besides Spain and France, respectively. Additionally, contrary to 
popular belief, the United States does not have an official lan-
guage, at least at the federal level.169 In recent years, some states 
have passed laws declaring English the official state language as 
part of the “English-Only” movement,170 but neither the FHA nor 
its accompanying regulations explicitly mandate that housing  
advertisements appear in English. 
In comparison to its more well-known provisions, § 3604(c) 
has not received much scholarly attention.171 Professor 
 
 167 On network effects, see Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at 489 (cited in note 27). 
 168 Because I conclude that the text of § 3604(c) is unclear, consideration of alterna-
tive sources is (arguably) appropriate under the plain meaning rule. But see William 
Baude and Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U Chi L Rev 539, 546–
47 (2017) (questioning why the probative value of nontextual information should depend 
on whether the text is clear). 
 169 Harmeet Kaur, FYI: English Isn’t the Official Language of the United States (CNN, 
June 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/F27N-TDY9. 
 170 See Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken 
Here, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev 293, 300 & n 55 (1989). 
 171 But see, for example, Reginald Leaman Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair 
Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Pu-
rity, and the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 Wm & Mary L Rev 69, 155–59 (1995); 
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Schwemm’s Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A 
New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision con-
tains an extensive treatment of the section.172 Schwemm surveys 
the relevant legislative history and emphasizes that despite its 
sparsity, § 3604(c) was intended to apply broadly to further  
Congress’s ultimate goal of housing integration.173 Yet he does not 
address the question presented in this Comment regarding the 
language in which housing advertisements appear.174 
My approach, described in Part III, draws significantly upon 
antisubordination theory. At its core, antisubordination theory 
posits that antidiscrimination law should not make disadvan-
taged groups worse off.175 The theory intersects with recent de-
bates regarding whether antidiscrimination laws should apply 
symmetrically or asymmetrically. Symmetrical laws, like  
Title VII, prohibit discrimination on the basis of a protected trait, 
such as race.176 Asymmetrical laws, like the Americans with  
Disabilities Act of 1990,177 prohibit discrimination only for a lim-
ited class of people, such as the disabled.178 Some scholars have 
argued that symmetry may actually further antisubordination 
goals,179 while others contend that asymmetrical enforcement of 
 
Debra L. Alligood, Comment, When the Medium Becomes the Message: A Proposal for  
Principal Media Liability for the Publication of Racially Exclusionary Real Estate  
Advertisements, 40 UCLA L Rev 199, 200 & n 8, 203 (1992). 
 172 See generally Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J 187 (cited in note 14). 
 173 Id at 212–13. 
 174 The only scholarly work addressing this question is a student Note by R. Ian  
Forrest. See generally Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J 839 (cited in note 17). Forrest argues that 
language is an element of national origin under the FHA, and therefore “foreign language 
advertising” for housing violates § 3604(c). Id at 853. He also argues that under the “ordi-
nary reader” test, an ordinary reader is necessarily a monolingual English speaker. Id at 
856. I find this slippage between native language and national origin troubling. Given the 
growing linguistic, racial, and cultural diversity of the United States, courts cannot as-
sume that advertisements appearing in languages other than English are per se discrim-
inatory. Moreover, the ordinary reader is not necessarily a monolingual English speaker 
as Forrest assumes. 
 175 See Fiss, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs at 157 (cited in note 25). See also Catherine A. 
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 117 
(Yale 1979); David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 S Ct Rev 99, 130–32; 
Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 Cal 
L Rev 935, 960 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich L Rev 2410, 
2429 (1994); Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U Miami L Rev 9, 28 (2003). 
 176 Schoenbaum, 2017 Wis L Rev at 76 (cited in note 22). 
 177 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 178 Schoenbaum, 2017 Wis L Rev at 76 (cited in note 22). 
 179 Id at 86. 
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antidiscrimination law is justified in some circumstances.180 With-
out taking sides in the debate over which regime is more effective 
or normatively desirable, I argue that courts should interpret the 
FHA as calling for not only housing integration, but also the 
breakdown of social hierarchies among races and nationalities. 
III.  APPLYING ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY TO THE FHA 
This Part outlines an approach in which the exclusive use of 
minority-language housing advertisements does not necessarily 
violate the FHA. Continuing to use Chicago’s Chinatown as a case 
study, Part III.A proposes a series of nonexhaustive factors that 
a court should consider when faced with a Chinese- or other  
minority-language housing advertisement. Even if an advertise-
ment is found to violate § 3604(c), courts should exercise discre-
tion in their damage awards, with an emphasis on the degree of 
harm caused, so as not to drive Chinese landlords and newspa-
pers out of the market entirely. 
In Part III.B, I take a broader view and consider whether 
courts and policymakers should reassess the FHA’s goal of pro-
moting housing integration at the expense of other values. Draw-
ing upon antisubordination theory, I conclude that the § 3604(c) 
should be construed narrowly to protect minority rights rather 
than mandating integration at all costs. This approach will pre-
serve the network effects that minority-language communities 
generate and ensure that the FHA does not further disadvantage 
historically marginalized communities. 
A. Factors to Guide Judicial Decision-Making 
There are many factors that a court might weigh when con-
fronted with a minority-language housing advertisement, but this 
Section advocates that they focus on the following: (1) the  
demographics of the relevant community, (2) the identities and 
language capabilities of the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s), (3) the 
content of the advertisement itself, and (4) the costs of transla-
tion. These factors emerge from HUD’s guidance on § 3604(c) in 
24 CFR Part 109, the “ordinary reader” standard, and practical 
considerations in analogous Title VII cases. 
 
 180 Areheart, 58 BC L Rev at 1123–29 (cited in note 22). 
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1. Demographics of the relevant community. 
First, the demographics of the community where an adver-
tisement appears should inform a court’s application of the “ordi-
nary reader” standard for § 3604(c) liability. HUD’s Part 109 sug-
gests that “the use of English language media alone or the 
exclusive use of media catering to the majority population in an 
area, when, in such area, there are also available non-English 
language or other minority media, may have discriminatory im-
pact.”181 Assuming that Part 109 is still good guidance, it is un-
clear how large an “area” should be. An “area” could hypotheti-
cally include all of Chicago, all of Chinatown, or just the block 
where a dwelling is located.182 And even if a court would decline 
to rely upon Part 109 as guidance, it is still persuasive authority 
due to the dearth of alternative sources. 
Borrowing from antitrust law, I propose defining the relevant 
community before engaging in § 3604(c) analysis of minority- 
language housing advertisements.183 In merger challenges under 
the antitrust laws, courts first define the relevant geographic 
market to determine if the proposed merger would harm compe-
tition in that market.184 Similarly, courts should determine the 
scope of a housing area before analyzing how an ordinary reader 
in that community would perceive an advertisement. Given that 
housing markets are inherently local and tied to metropolitan ar-
eas, a national scale would be far too large. Instead, courts should 
apply HUD’s definition of “geographic area” in its Affirmatively  
Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule.185 HUD defines geographic 
area as “a jurisdiction, region, State, Core-Based Statistical Area 
(CBSA), or another applicable area (e.g., census tract, neighbor-
hood, Zip code, block group, housing development, or portion 
thereof).”186 This definition would provide courts with flexibility 
to define the relevant community in light of local conditions. 
For instance, in Chicago’s Chinatown, a court might look to a 
map of Chicago’s seventy-seven community areas as a starting 
 
 181 Previously codified at 24 CFR § 109.25 (emphases added). See Part II.B. 
 182 See Part II.B. 
 183 See Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294, 336–37 (1962) (“[A]lthough 
the geographic market in some instances may encompass the entire Nation, under other 
circumstances it may be as small as a single metropolitan area.”). 
 184 See US Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines § 4.2 (2010) (explaining how the agencies define a geographic market). 
 185 See Part I.B. 
 186 24 CFR § 5.152. 
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point.187 Curiously, however, “Chinatown” is not an officially des-
ignated community area; rather, it occupies portions of the areas 
labeled Armour Square and Bridgeport, demonstrating that mu-
nicipal designations are imperfect representations of neighbor-
hood identity.188 Alternatively, a court could draw upon the  
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hills v Gautreaux,189 which sug-
gests that the relevant community will often extend beyond the 
city limits to an entire metropolitan area.190 At minimum, histor-
ical research on Chicago’s Chinatown indicates that the relevant 
community should include the area north of the Stevenson high-
way, east of the Chicago river, and west of Clark Street, creating 
a rough triangle on the city’s near southwest side.191 
Once a court has defined the relevant area, it should then ex-
amine census data regarding the percentage of residents in the 
relevant community that speak or read languages other than  
Chinese, and if so, what languages.192 The Eastern District of 
Michigan’s decision in Real Estate One lends support for this ap-
proach. In that case, the court analyzed patterns of racial change 
in Detroit before ordering a remedy to combat the defendant’s ra-
cially discriminatory advertising practices.193 Courts could also 
consider what percentage (if any) of affordable housing is excluded 
from non-Chinese prospective residents through the exclusive use 
 
 187 See, for example, Chicago Neighborhoods (cited in note 31). 
 188 See Ling, Chinese Chicago at 55 (cited in note 32) (identifying areas 34 and 60 as 
Armour Square and Bridgeport, respectively). For more detailed maps, see Armour Square 
(City of Chicago, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/3MJ2-QYCN; Bridgeport (City of  
Chicago, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/B73H-MBZE. 
 Chicagoans themselves disagree over the proper boundaries between neighborhoods. 
See, for example, Tanveer Ali, This Is Where Chicagoans Say the Borders of Their Neigh-
borhoods Are (DNAinfo, Sept 28, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/FZP2-BBN3 (illus-
trating how Chicagoans draw the boundaries of various neighborhoods, but not depicting 
Chinatown). 
 189 425 US 284 (1976). 
 190 Id at 299 (concluding, in a case alleging racial discrimination in public housing, 
that “[t]he relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is 
the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits”). Gautreaux is arguably distin-
guishable, however, in that it involved public housing, rather than private landlords or 
publishers. 
 191 See, for example, Ling, Chinese Chicago at 52 (cited in note 32). See also id at  
216–17. 
 192 See, for example, Ryan, Language Use in the United States *2 (cited in note 10) 
(noting that US Census data from the American Community Survey “provides reliable 
estimates for small levels of geography, including counties, cities, and tracts, allowing ex-
ploration of the distribution of language use across states and metropolitan areas of the 
United States”). 
 193 Real Estate One, 433 F Supp at 1145–46. See Part II.C.2. 
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of Chinese-language advertisements, and what percentage of that 
excluded population consists of racial or ethnic minorities.194 These 
statistics will help determine the degree of harm caused by deny-
ing non-Chinese residents easy access to listings in Chinatown. 
2. The identities and language capabilities of the parties. 
In order to determine if a plaintiff actually suffered psychic 
harm from an allegedly discriminatory advertisement, a court can 
and should consider the identities of the parties.195 Specifically, a 
court should examine the race, national origin, and language abil-
ities of the plaintiff and defendant. 
For example, in Chicago’s Chinatown, if a Chinese landlord 
or publisher can speak or write in another language, that may 
counsel in favor of liability because the landlord or publisher 
could have easily provided a parallel translation. If a landlord or 
publisher cannot speak or write in another language, liability is 
probably not called for, as it would seem inconsistent with the 
antisubordination goals underlying the FHA to impose a duty on 
immigrants to advertise in languages they do not know.196 
Next, courts should consider whether the plaintiff can read 
or speak a language other than Chinese. If the plaintiff can in fact 
read Chinese and understands the advertisement, the harm from 
reading it might seem insignificant at first glance. But such a 
reader could argue that the exclusive use of Chinese-language 
housing advertisements denied her the ability to live in an inte-
grated community.197 If the plaintiff cannot understand Chinese, 
that would tip the scale in favor of liability, assuming that the 
plaintiff interpreted the advertisement as a signal that he or she 
is unwelcome in the community. Proponents of a “colorblind” ap-
proach to antidiscrimination law might object that the identities 
 
 194 See, for example, Gautreaux, 425 US at 288 (citing evidence that “the public hous-
ing system [in Chicago] was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects 
located in white neighborhoods and with 99½% of the remaining family units located in 
Negro neighborhoods”). 
 195 Title VII case law also considers the parties’ identities. Under the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit 
must first establish “that he belongs to a racial minority.” McDonnell Douglas Corp v 
Green, 411 US 792, 802 (1973). 
 196 See EEOC v Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d 233, 237–38 (7th Cir 1993) 
(suggesting that imposing additional burdens on minority businesses may run counter to 
Title VII’s goal of increasing economic opportunity to minorities). 
 197 See Trafficante, 409 US at 212 (holding that white residents had standing to  
sue their landlord for depriving them of the opportunity to live in a racially integrated 
community). 
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of the parties should be irrelevant, but this information is crucial 
for judges to calculate damage awards if liability is ultimately  
established.198 
3. Content of the advertisement itself. 
Having defined the relevant community and considered the 
language capabilities and identities of the parties, courts should 
then consider the content of the advertisement or advertisements 
in question. As discussed in Part II.C.3, § 3604(c) liability is un-
likely to arise from a single advertisement, at least in the context 
of human models.199 By contrast, a plaintiff may have a stronger 
claim when an advertisement is viewed alongside a series of ad-
vertisements.200 The inquiry then becomes whether a minority-
language advertising campaign conveys a discriminatory prefer-
ence to an ordinary reader. 
Courts should not rush to the conclusion that an ordinary 
reader is a monolingual English speaker.201 Rather, an ordinary 
reader is a person who lives in the relevant community.202 Such a 
reader might only read Chinese, but she might also read Spanish, 
English, or some other language, depending on how the commu-
nity is defined. Complicating matters further, there is significant 
variation within the broader Chinese community. Mandarin  
Chinese speakers are more likely to read simplified Chinese, 
while Taiwanese and Cantonese speakers are more likely to read 
traditional Chinese characters.203 
Admittedly, it is cold comfort that non-Chinese readers do not 
know what they are missing if they encounter a Chinese housing 
advertisement and cannot understand it. Facebook recently found 
itself in hot water when ProPublica revealed that the social net-
working site allows housing advertisers to target their ads by 
 
 198 Notable advocates of colorblindness in antidiscrimination law include Alexander 
M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (Yale 1975) (condemning the use of racial quotas 
“in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant”) and  
William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale 
L J 995, 1000, 1003–05 (1984) (arguing against the use of racial preferences to correct 
imbalances). 
 199 See, for example, Housing Opportunities Made Equal, 943 F2d at 648 (concluding 
that a single ad featuring a white model, standing alone, would not violate § 3604(c) as a 
matter of law). 
 200 See Ragin, 923 F2d at 1002. 
 201 My approach contrasts with Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 856 (cited in note 17). 
 202 On the “ordinary reader” standard, see Part II.A.3. 
 203 See Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 856 n 91 (cited in note 17). 
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race.204 Similarly, the cumulative effect of an absence of advertise-
ments in languages other than Chinese could still convey a mes-
sage that non-Chinese residents are not welcome. Yet again, the 
key question for § 3604(c) analysis is whether an ordinary reader 
in the relevant community would interpret the advertising cam-
paign as indicating a discriminatory preference on the basis of 
race or national origin. 
4. Translation costs. 
With the rise of Google Translate and other translation soft-
ware, the costs associated with translating an advertisement are 
decreasing. Nonetheless, on balance, landlords should bear the 
costs of translation. Landlords presumably have greater access to 
economic and social capital than recent immigrants, and thus can 
more readily provide translations upon request. At the same time, 
courts should be wary of imposing too high a burden (in terms of 
liability or increased costs) on minority-language newspapers, 
such as The Chicago Chinese Times.205 The Ragin court recognized 
this danger: 
[T]he [New York] Times is fearful that such claims from a 
multitude of plaintiffs might lead to a large number of stag-
gering, perhaps crushing, damage awards that might over 
time impair the press’s role in society. . . . The potential for 
large numbers of truly baseless claims for emotional injury 
[ ] exists, and there appears to be no ready device, other than 
wholly speculative judgments as to credibility, to separate 
the genuine from the baseless.206 
The court was careful to note, however, that publishers should 
not be immunized from liability merely because they might go out 
of business. Instead, the court emphasized the importance of  
“assert[ing] judicial control over the size of damage awards for 
emotional injury in individual cases.”207 
 
 204 Julia Angwin and Terry Parris Jr, Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by 
Race (ProPublica, Oct 28, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/7F9H-LWDG; Julia Angwin, 
Ariana Tobin, and Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Ex-
clude Users by Race (ProPublica, Nov 21, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/SPQ5-BANE. 
 205 See generally 芝加哥時報 (The Chicago Chinese Times), online at https:// 
chicagochinesetimes.com (visited Aug 19, 2019). As of this writing, Google Chrome can 
translate the text of the webpage, but not the surrounding advertisements. 
 206 Ragin, 923 F2d at 1004–05. 
 207 Id. 
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Similarly, in EEOC v Consolidated Service Systems,208 the 
Seventh Circuit held that a small business’s use of word-of-mouth 
hiring, which resulted in an overwhelmingly Korean workforce, 
did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.209 The company’s 
owner purchased three newspaper advertisements, two in a gen-
eral circulation newspaper and one in a Korean-language newspa-
per, but those advertisements resulted in no hires, and the word-
of-mouth system was much cheaper.210 Judge Richard Posner  
observed that “[i]t would be a bitter irony if the federal agency 
dedicated to enforcing the antidiscrimination laws succeeded in 
using those laws to kick these people off the ladder by compelling 
them to institute costly systems of hiring.”211 Moreover, “[t]he fact 
that [job applicants] are ethnically or racially uniform does not 
impose upon [a hiring manager] a duty to spend money advertis-
ing in the help-wanted columns of the Chicago Tribune.”212 Thus, 
the foregoing analysis should not impose a duty upon landlords and 
publishers to create advertisements in every conceivable language. 
Instead, courts should interpret § 3604(c) such that publish-
ing an advertisement exclusively in Chinese would not weigh in 
favor of liability unless the landlord or publisher refused to pro-
vide a translation upon request and had the ability to do so. Re-
call that there is no Mrs. Murphy exception to § 3604(c),213 so 
courts should consider a landlord’s sophistication or lack thereof 
before assigning responsibility for translation costs. If a landlord 
or publisher has the ability to translate an advertisement but is 
reluctant to accept applications from tenants lacking Chinese-
language skills, that would weigh in favor of finding that Chinese-
only advertisements violate § 3604(c). This approach balances  
the FHA’s goal of expanding access to housing while permitting 
landlords and publishers to signal that Chinatown is a Chinese-
language community. 
B. Network Effects and Language Communities 
Although my proposed solution stipulates that Chinese- 
language advertisements do not necessarily violate the FHA, 
many such advertisements may nonetheless be subject to 
 
 208 989 F2d 233 (7th Cir 1993). 
 209 Id at 236. 
 210 Id at 235. 
 211 Id at 238. 
 212 Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 237. 
 213 See 42 USC § 3603(b)(1)–(2). See also note 107 and accompanying text. 
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§ 3604(c) liability. From an antisubordination perspective, this 
result seems troubling, in that it exacerbates rather than combats 
the subordinate position of a disadvantaged group—in this case, 
Chinese immigrants. Thus, it may be time to rethink courts’ ten-
dency to interpret the FHA as privileging housing integration at 
the expense of competing values. 
Ethnic enclaves generate network effects by attracting a crit-
ical mass of minority-language speakers and readers to a commu-
nity. Yet overzealous “colorblind” enforcement of § 3604(c) against 
minority-language advertisements would negate these effects and 
run counter to the antisubordination promise of the FHA. To the 
extent that the text of the FHA conflicts with this interpretation, 
I urge policymakers to consider amending § 3604(c) to make clear 
that minority-language housing advertisements do not violate the 
FHA absent evidence of discriminatory intent. In other words, the 
creators of such advertisements should not be liable unless extrin-
sic evidence suggests that they intended to discriminate against 
prospective residents who cannot understand their language. 
Even without amending the FHA, this interpretation is consistent 
with § 3604(c)’s prohibition on making, printing, or publishing ad-
vertisements with “an intention to make [a discriminatory] pref-
erence, limitation, or discrimination.”214 
1. The benefits of residential homogeneity. 
Proponents of critical legal studies and critical race theory 
have cast doubt on the notion that integration always redounds 
to the benefit of marginalized communities. A significant body of 
work criticizes the Brown v Board of Education215 decision for fail-
ing to improve the educational outcomes of black students,216 and 
for causing negative externalities, such as lost job opportunities 
for black teachers.217 Admittedly, these concerns were not at the 
forefront of Congress’s discussions when it passed the FHA.218 But 
given what we know today about the costs and limitations of  
 
 214 42 USC § 3604(c). 
 215 347 US 483 (1954). 
 216 See, for example, Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education 
and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform 180–81, 196–98 (Oxford 2004); Gerald  
N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 40 (Chicago 
2d ed 2008). 
 217 See Adam Fairclough, The Costs of Brown: Black Teachers and School Integration, 
91 J Am Hist 43, 46–47 (2004). 
 218 See Part I.B.1. 
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integration to achieve racial justice, courts should avoid rigid ap-
plications of the FHA against the very communities it was in-
tended to protect in the first place.219 
Some forms of residential homogeneity are designed to ex-
clude marginalized groups. Professor Lior Strahilevitz has argued 
that many residential communities use “exclusionary amenities,” 
such as golf courses, to achieve racial homogeneity in spite of the 
FHA.220 Because playing golf is a close proxy for whiteness, charg-
ing a premium to live near a golf course tends to exclude black 
residents from a community.221 “Exclusionary vibes,” ranging 
from architectural styles to condominium names, also act as  
signaling devices for who is welcome in the community.222  
Strahilevitz is careful to note, however, that exclusionary ameni-
ties are not inherently bad: “Where a religious, linguistic, or other 
minority community genuinely requires some measure of critical 
mass to thrive, it may be appropriate for the state to subsidize the 
creation of exclusionary amenities or, failing that, at least to re-
main neutral.”223 For example, the deaf community in Laurent, 
South Dakota, may even generate positive externalities: 
There are strong welfarist arguments for such a residential 
arrangement, given the network effects and economies of 
scale associated with bringing speakers of [sign] language to-
gether in one place. There are sound political representation 
arguments as well, and Laurent organizers are particularly 
enticed by the prospect of electing representatives who will 
be forceful advocates for their interests.224 
Courts and policymakers should consider the benefits of bringing 
together a community of Chinese-language speakers, not only for 
network effects and political representation, but also for the in-
herent benefits of preserving an inclusive space for recent immi-
grants and Chinese Americans.225 
 
 219 But see Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration 112–17 (Princeton 
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 221 See id at 464–68. 
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 223 Strahilevitz, 92 Va L Rev at 498 (cited in note 220). 
 224 Id at 497. 
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At first blush, an interpretation of the FHA that acknowl-
edges residential homogeneity as desirable in some communities 
might seem counterintuitive.226 I am not aligning myself with 
those who say that segregation is entirely voluntary and therefore 
integration is not a policy priority or a social good.227 My approach 
is not intended to give “white ethnic” communities a playbook to 
discriminate against black or Hispanic communities. Rather, the 
goal is to challenge judges and policymakers to think beyond the 
black/white racial dichotomy that framed the debate when the 
FHA was enacted.228 
2. The perils of “colorblind” enforcement. 
An antisubordinationist interpretation of the FHA would also 
prevent the paradoxical enforcement of § 3604(c) in ways that 
mandate assimilation (and hasten gentrification) by assuming 
that native English speakers are the default ordinary reader. 229 
If an ordinary reader only reads English, non-English advertise-
ments would be at greater risk of liability, even though such  
advertisements themselves expand access to housing for non- 
English speakers. Historically, American jurisprudence has “en-
code[d] or protect[ed] a default ‘white’ normative perspective, 
making whites’ interests seem invisible or natural.”230 Yet  
Chinese landlords may not be able to speak or write languages 
other than Chinese. In this sense, housing is distinct from the 
employment context, in which some jobs reasonably require that 
an employee can speak English.231 The harms suffered from  
exclusionary advertisements will almost certainly be greater for 
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historically disadvantaged groups than for whites, and it seems 
unjust to impose a de facto duty that landlords who are immi-
grants themselves must speak and write in English. 
Critics may object that my approach will lead to underen-
forcement of the FHA against Chinese landlords. If Chinese land-
lords or newspapers are not liable for the exclusive use of Chinese 
in housing advertisements, the argument would go, it will be 
harder for individuals and enforcement authorities to detect ad-
vertisements that substantively discriminate in violation of 
§ 3604(c). This fear is not unwarranted. For example, some  
Chinese-language advertisements in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
have indicated prohibited preferences on the basis of sex, marital 
status, and familial status, including blatantly discriminatory 
warnings, such as, “if you have children don’t bother asking.”232 
Underenforcement of the FHA is unlikely if, as suggested 
above, plaintiffs can state a claim under § 3604(c) when a land-
lord refuses to provide a translation but has the means to do so. 
In that case, the prospect of § 3604(c) liability should deter land-
lords from putting discriminatory messages in Chinese-language 
advertisements in the first place. Extrinsic evidence of discrimi-
natory intent to exclude non-Chinese minorities could also bolster 
a claim that an advertisement indicates a discriminatory prefer-
ence on the basis of race or national origin.233 This difficult bal-
ancing act underscores the need for fact-specific, thoughtful ap-
plication of § 3604(c). 
Enforcement agencies also have an important role to play. 
Simply put, HUD and DOJ should not make civil actions against 
Chinese landlords and publishers a top priority. Absent evidence 
of a widespread “pattern or practice” of discrimination against 
non-Chinese prospective residents,234 federal, state, and local 
agencies should concentrate their efforts on blatantly discrimina-
tory notices, statements, and advertisements, particularly those 
that seek to maintain all-white neighborhoods. HUD has limited 
resources for secretary-initiated complaints and should focus its 
efforts accordingly.235 State and local housing authorities should 
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adopt a similar approach.236 However, because the FHA depends 
heavily on private attorneys general,237 the recommendations in 
this Part have focused on how courts should interpret the law, not 
which cases the government should bring. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has proposed a novel solution to the uncertain 
legality of minority-language housing advertisements. Using  
Chicago’s Chinatown as a case study, I argue that such advertise-
ments do not violate the FHA unless a series of factors suggests 
that they indicate a discriminatory preference. Specifically, 
courts should consider the demographics of the relevant commu-
nity, the identities and language abilities of the parties, the con-
tent of the advertisement itself, and the cost of translation. Evi-
dence of discriminatory intent should weigh heavily in favor of 
finding that an advertisement or series of advertisements violates 
§ 3604(c), but courts should otherwise hesitate before imposing 
liability. This solution flows from an appreciation of the antisub-
ordination goals underlying the FHA, as well as the substantial 
network effects that minority-language communities generate. 
My ultimate goal is to balance the benefits of pro-Chinese  
inclusion against the potential for non-Chinese exclusion from 
Chinatown. Section 3604(c) is an important tool in the fight 
against housing discrimination, but courts and enforcement  
agencies should recognize the limitations of this provision to force 
integration. 
Although this Comment has focused on Chicago’s Chinatown, 
the analysis has obvious applications to other ethnic enclaves. For 
example, my approach could extend to Chicago’s predominantly 
Hispanic Little Village neighborhood or to Little Saigon in  
Orange County, California. Further research into the pervasive-
ness of non-English housing advertisements in these and other 
neighborhoods is necessary. 
This Comment also has implications for antidiscrimination 
law more broadly. It raises difficult questions surrounding the 
role of ethnic enclaves in the wake of the FHA and the extent to 
which advertisements may signal preferences for target audi-
ences. My solution is informed by antisubordination theory, but I 
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recognize the value of symmetrical enforcement of antidiscrimi-
nation law to further antisubordination goals.238 This Comment 
also urges courts to consider the substantial network effects that 
minority-language communities like Chinatown generate. Going 
forward, policymakers should consider how best to ensure that 
ethnic enclaves are not only welfare-enhancing, but also compat-
ible with a pluralist society.239 
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